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Buddhist brains: A Case Study in the Reenchantment of the Brain Sciences 
 
Anne Harrington 
   
Does science disenchant the world? Is it an enterprise that drains the world of all inherent 
meaning and human value? The knowing perspective of modernity tends to assume that 
the answer is yes. It was, of course, the sociologist Max Weber who offered the classic 
rendering of the disenchantment thesis in his 1918 lecture at the University of Munich, 
“Science as a Vocation.”  : 
Who--aside from certain big children who are indeed found in the natural 
sciences--still believes that the findings of astronomy, biology, physics, or 
chemistry could teach us anything about the meaning of the world? If there is any 
such "meaning," along which road could one come upon its tracks?  If these 
natural sciences lead to anything in this way, they are apt to make the belief that 
there is such a thing as the "meaning" of the universe die out at its very roots. ... 
Tolstoy has given us the simplest answer, with the words: "Science is meaningless 
because it gives no answers to our question, the only question important for us: 
'What shall we do and how shall we live?'"  That science does not give an answer 
to this is indisputable (Weber 1922). 
 
Now, Weber says the conclusion he reaches is indisputable. But he also concedes -- even 
if in the most disparaging and briefest of ways -- that actually some people, even within 
the sciences, did dispute his conclusion. One of these, the Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang 
Köhler was the author of a 1938 book remembered today more for its title than for the 
details of its argument: The Place of Values in a World of Facts.  Köhler felt he had 
reason to believe – on empirical grounds -- that the disenchanting message people were 
hearing from the sciences in general, and from the mind and brain sciences in particular, 
was misplaced. New developments, new findings in the mind and brain sciences of his 
time, he taught, were showing that  people’s minds, when they engage with the world, 
have no choice but to see structure, order,  and value  everywhere.  One might think that   2 
this perception of order and value is just an illusion that the brain imposes onto the world, 
but he stressed that that was not so. Evidence from physics and biology showed that top-
down ordering processes could be found at all levels of reality --  we are “required” to see 
the values that we see in the world, Köhler said, because on some deep level they are 
really there . And this insight meant that human beings no longer had to feel like orphans 
in the universe, because the values that they cherish in their hearts turn out to really exist 
in the natural world (Köhler 1938). 
For us today, living in an age of behavioral genomics, brain science, and pharmacology, 
the discipline that Köhler had chosen as his wedge into the disenchantment debates might 
feel particularly ironic. Is it not the case, we think, that Weber’s vision of disenchantment 
is actually being most vigorously realized today in the brain sciences above all?  Is it not 
the case, we think, that as the brain sciences turn their sights on everything from shyness 
to schizophrenia, it flattens our subjectivity, deprives us of our sense of moral agency, 
turns us into the sum of our molecular interactions, or the product of those functions that 
can be recorded on a brain scans? There is definitely no place for human values, we 
think, in a brain scan. 
  The viewpoint of the anthropologist Emily Martin, expressed in the course of a 
Presidential Keynote Address to the American Ethnological Society in the year 2000, is 
relatively typical here. “Neuroreductionism,” she said, was on the rise, winning converts 
and influence at such a rate that  she and her colleagues were left blinking (as she put it):  
 … like a deer in the headlights of a Mack truck, realizing how the new 
neuroscience is eradicating the social and cultural (by reducing them to more 
fundamental processes in the brain), how it is gaining recruits from sibling 
disciplines, and how it relies on a caricature of how anthropology understands 
social and cultural phenomena. (Martin 2000) 
   3 
  But is this all there is to say?  In my own work as an historian of the mind and 
brain sciences, I’ve wanted to resist the reflex tendency to assume that the neurological 
turn in our culture can, taken as a whole, be summarily understood as a wholesale project 
in the disenchantment of our humanness. I am persuaded that, when it comes time to 
write the history of the neurological turn of our times, it will be found that things were 
more complex; that in the fact the brain sciences came in our time to serve as an arena, 
not just for reductionist, disenchanting work, but also for projects we might consider 
efforts at re-enchantment and value-seeking. Just as people in Weber’s time resisted his 
dire message, so people in our time resist the doom-saying conclusions of humanists like 
Emily Martin, and attempt to show that the brain sciences themselves allow for a more 
optimistic vision. 
  There are any number of case studies to which I might now turn in order to 
demonstrate this thesis. I want to offer just one. The simple way to talk about this case 
study is that it deals with efforts to study the effects of meditation training on the brain 
functioning of advanced practitioners, especially Tibetan Buddhist monks. My point will 
be, however, that nothing is really simple here. 
  My argument here will proceed in stages. I will begin by explaining what the 
studies say: how they work as science. I will then make the case that we have here to do 
with something that is not just science, but also a cultural project, a project in value-
seeking and value-making, a project in re-enchantment. After that, I aim to say something 
about how this project came to be: tell a bit of the mostly unknown history behind it. 
Finally, I want to offer some thoughts on what larger light this project in particular can   4 
cast on the larger efforts of our time to create pockets of enchantment within the brain 
sciences.  
What Do the Studies Say? 
  The bare scientific claims about the brain-functioning of advanced Buddhist 
practitioners of meditation proceed in a hierarchy of increasing spectacularity. The first 
claim is that the brains of such practitioners are more stable, less prone to startle and 
involuntary emotional reactions than those of ordinary people—when presented with 
sudden loud noises, for example, their amygdalas are less trigger-happy, and their startle 
responses are more muted.  The second claim is that such people have baseline levels of 
positive affect, of happiness, that are notably higher than that of ordinary people: fMRI 
scans of such practitioners show higher than average levels of left prefrontal activity, 
supposed to be associated with well-being The third claim is that these practitioners 
synchronize different elements of experience more effectively than ordinary people; 
studies have shown striking synchrony in the electrical activation across different part of 
the brain, that is believed by the researchers to have functional significance .  
The fourth and last claim is arguably most interesting of all: it is a claim that the brains of 
these practitioners are capable of compassion at levels unknown in the West.  When nine 
monks were asked to engage in a particular meditation practice designed to cultivate 
compassion, the researchers documented brain wave activity unlike anything ever seen in 
other healthy human subjects: gamma waves (indicative of intense alertness) that were 30 
times as strong as that of a student control group (Lutz 2004, Harrington and Zajonc, 
2006, Begley 2007).     5 
  Now: this last claim in particular begins to mix value and norms up with brain 
science ways that could interest us here, but one might say that it does not in itself 
represent an “enchanted” claim: that is to say, a claim that helps us discover some kind of 
inherent meaning and value in the physical world. Indeed, there is a way in which we 
might see these studies of Buddhist brains as actually evidence for Emily Martin’s point 
that the brain sciences are everywhere, turning all aspects of human behavior into the 
sum of what can be seen on a brain scan. But obviously, I am saying that there is a 
difference here. What is it? 
The Case for Re-enchantment 
  It is true that we are seeing a lot of efforts in the neurosciences these days to see 
what the brain sciences might have to say about aspects of human behaviour previously 
not widely thought to be susceptible to naturalizing explanations: religious experience, 
morality, aesthetic reactions, economic decision making. These other projects often bring 
a certain confidence, even bravado to their work that is likely part of what so alarms 
people like Martin (we can find the God spot in the brain! We can relate moral behaviors 
to prefrontal lobe functioning!). The Buddhist brains project feels different from those 
other projects for exactly the way it is characterized, not by bravado, but by a kind of 
self-conscious humility.  In this project, scientists come, not just to figure things out, but 
to be improved by an encounter Tibetan Buddhism, an ancient Eastern tradition that is 
believed by these scientists to be, not only morally exemplary, but also deeply wise about 
the ways of the mind in its own way. 
  And having made this point, we need now to put another word on the table: 
“Orientalism” (Said 1975). This refers to the tendency to see the East as our imagined   6 
Other and opposite, to turn it into the ancient balm for our modernist woes, the mystical 
antidote to our rationalistic malaise. In vision of an enchanted encounter between ancient 
wisdom and brain science, the Dalai Lama functions as a critical – perhaps the most 
critical – character.  He is a close personal friend of one of the key scientists behind the 
monk studies, Richie Davidson.  It is known that he has personally blessed all the brain 
studies of monks, and that he has a strong personal interest in science (he is fond of 
saying that, had he not become the Dalai Lama, he would have liked to have been an 
engineer [Dalai Lama 2005]).  Since the late 1990s, he has become a favored guest of 
honor at various high-profile meetings to discuss the effects of meditation on the brain. 
Most remarkably of all, on November 12, 2005, the Dalai Lama addressed some 14,000 
neuroscientists at the annual meeting of the Society of Neuroscience on the theme “the 
neuroscience of meditation”  (Gerland 2006). 
Why is he so visible in this enterprise?  Why so sought out? The most important 
answer is that he functions to amplify the larger cultural message that this is not just brain 
science as usual, but something deeper, finer, and more daring.  The Dalai Lama 
functions in this studies both as the embodiment of an ancient tradition, and a living 
example of its great benefits. Certainly, he often has very interesting things to say about 
the studies, but even when he is largely silent at these meetings, just listening, his 
presence enlarges the meaning of everything that is said.  
How Did We Get Here? 
  All this has happened, not because it was inevitable, but because of a little-known 
history that I want now to unpack, at least briefly and partially.  Knowing a bit of history   7 
is helpful, because it will help us notice some instabilities and further complexities at the 
heart of this enterprise that we might otherwise fail to see.  
  For our purposes, we can begin with a cardiologist named Herbert Benson, who in 
the early 1970s, had an encounter with the counter-culture .  Benson was interested in 
stress and in particular in the possibility that there might be ways to lower blood pressure 
using biofeedback or conditioning techniques. A group of young people who had learned 
Transcendental Meditation from the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi told him to stop studying 
monkeys and start studying them. Through simple meditative techniques, they could 
lower their blood pressure and much more besides. 
Benson agreed to study them, and concluded that they were broadly right. The 
practice of TM actually seemed to result in a systematic reversal of the stress response; 
he called it the “relaxation response.” But then he went on to say that these findings bore 
in no way on the truth or relevance of any counterculture popular beliefs in the 
superiority of Asian spiritual practices.  It was simply a physiological finding, one that he 
endeavored to thoroughly dissociate from its counterculture and Asian associations, and 
make a completely practical and straightforward – disenchanted – affair, a health 
intervention like jogging or taking vitamins. And he had considerable success in 
promoting this disenchanted vision of meditation as a stress-buster (Benson 1975, 
Harrington 2008).  
  In 1979, however, Benson was introduced to the Dalai Lama of Tibet, who was 
taking his first trip to the United States. The visa for that trip had been reluctantly granted 
by the U.S. government - involved in those year in delicate diplomacy with China -- on 
the condition that the Dalai Lama agree that he was visiting, not as an exiled head of   8 
state, but simply as a religious leader on a spiritual visit. There must be no discussion of 
the Chinese occupation, he was told, or anything else politically sensitive (Dart, 1979). 
  He was as good as his word. When reporters asked him about China or anything 
that might be construed as political, he responded with one or another good-natured 
deflection, and went on to talk about inter-religious dialogue, ethics, baseball, and other 
safe themes. When he had the chance, he also talked about science. For example, at a 
meeting of scholars held in Texas on his behalf, he told them “I’d like to listen to your 
experiences. I’d like to hear what is the latest in research into the relations between 
consciousness and matter, and how they affect each other” (Vecsey, 1979)  
  In fact, the scholars in Texas did not have much to say about those matters, and so 
the conversation there turned in other directions. Two weeks later, however, the Dalai 
Lama came to Harvard University for a three-day visit, and one of the people he met 
there was the cardiologist Herbert Benson, who did have things to say on this topic. 
Benson told the Dalai Lama all about how he had been studying the physiology of 
meditation.  Then he admitted that he had a request of his own. He was interested, he 
said, in taking his work on the physiology of meditation to the next stage. He knew that 
there was an esoteric Tibetan meditative practice called g’T’ummo or “inner heat” 
meditation, during which advanced practitioners were said to be able to regulate their 
thermal production to stay warm even in frigid weather conditions and without warm 
clothing. If this could truly be done, it would be of great physiological and medical 
interest. Would the Dalai Lama assist him, Benson asked, in the task of persuading some 
appropriate Tibetan monks to participate in some physiological experiments?    9 
  As Benson always later publicly recalled the conversation, the Dalai Lama’s 
response was immediate and straightforward at the meeting: "His Holiness agreed to help 
me." But documents in the Benson archives, housed in Harvard’s Medical School, reveal 
that there was more politics and strategy than that behind the radical decision to say yes. 
The Dalai Lama was initially inclined to say no; the monks did what they did for 
religious reasons and this would risk disturbing them. Then he suddenly thought again, 
and said: “Still, our friends to the East might be impressed with a Western explanation of 
what we are doing.” In other words, this might impress the Chinese, who spent a great 
deal of energy on their side trivializing all of Tibetan religious practices as empty 
superstition with no value. It was at this point that he turned back to Benson and said yes. 
The Dalai Lama was not allowed to be overtly political during this trip to the United 
States, but he was not going to turn down an opportunity to assist the Tibetan cause and 
change the dynamic of Sino-Tibetan relations if one simply opened up for him (Benson 
1979, Paine 2004). Besides, as he later repeatedly noted, there might well be benefit for 
many in the West from this work, if they could be persuaded through science to take 
meditation seriously. 
  What is important about this event is not so much the controversial studies on 
monks who practiced g’T’ummo, that Benson then did carry out (Benson 1982, Cromie 
2002). What is important is the fact that the Dalai Lama, for partially political reasons, 
had decided to open a door between brain science and the most esoteric and traditionally 
private practices of the Tibetan Buddhist spiritual tradition. And that decision in turn set 
the stage for the emergence of the specific project in reenchanted brain science that we’re 
tracking here.   10 
  Here’s why. Even though Benson brought a fundamentally disenchanting, or 
normalizing sensibility to his interest in the brain basis of meditation– including 
g’T’ummo meditation -- others who walked through that door after him did not 
necessarily share his cultural values.  In the early 1990s, the psychologist Richard 
Davidson was introduced to the Dalai Lama in the course of participating in a meeting 
organized in Dharalamsa, India  on the  “health benefits of meditation” (Goleman, 2003). 
As a graduate student at Harvard, Richie had been deeply involved in the counterculture 
turn to the East in the 1970s. In the intervening years, he had gotten a job in a first-ranked 
university, become respected by mainstream psychology, and turned his research interest 
in other directions.  
But the meeting with the Dalai Lama in the early1990s gave him an opportunity 
to reconnect to his youthful passion. At that meeting, people asked what was known 
about the physiological basis and effects of advanced meditation. The answer, 
predictably, was “very little.”  As the conversation continued, both in the meeting and 
informally over meals, a new idea emerged. Perhaps, with the advent of new, more 
portable instruments for measuring cognitive and brain function, it was now possible to 
do the kinds of studies of which people previously had only dreamed: to study the effects 
of long-term and intensive meditative practice on the brains and cognitive functioning of 
senior monks from the Tibetan monastic community 
Obviously, though, this would only be possible with the approval of the Dalai 
Lama. What would he think? In a different time, with a different Dalai Lama, in a 
different political culture, the answer might well have been a firm no. But it wasn’t. Just 
as he had said yes to Benson, the Dalai Lama said yes to this group. They could study the   11 
monks. In fact, so enthusiastic was the Dalai Lama about the idea that he actually went to 
the trouble of personally asking the Council for Religious and Cultural Affairs of the 
Tibetan government-in-exile to identify the most experienced senior monks living in 
retreat in the mountains above Dharamsala, so he could provide that information to the 
scientists who would do the research 
  The first effort to do this largely failed – the monks meditating in huts above 
Dharamsala were both suspicious of what was being asked of them (they feared the 
equipment might hurt them), and also largely failed to see its point. If a person wants to 
understand meditation, that person should learn to meditate, they thought (see 
Houshmand et al. 2002). It was only when a senior Tibetan monk named Matthieu 
Ricard, got involved, that the effort turned a corner. Matthieu is a senior Tibetan monk 
living in Nepal, but he is French-born and, before he entered monastic life thirty years 
earlier, he was a graduate student in biochemistry in Paris, working under the Nobel 
laureate Francois Jacob. He didn’t fear science, he was willing to volunteer his own 
brain, and within a year, with the blessing of the Dalai Lama, he was able to persuade 
other monks from Nepal to come to Richie’s lab and volunteer their own brains. 
.  Now: all this still might not have unfolded the way it did had the pump not been 
primed in the way it had. The fact is that the 1990s was, not just the decade of the brain; 
it was also the decade of America’s love affair with Tibet. Having won the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 1989 for his non-violent efforts to negotiate the Tibetan cause with the Chinese 
government, the Dalai Lama began traveling ever more frequently to the West. As he did, 
eloquent followers like the Columbia University Professor of Tibetan Studies Robert 
Thurman were successful in framing a message about Tibetan culture that emphasized its   12 
relevance for the malaise of Western modern life. Tibetan culture, Thurman taught, is not 
just for Tibetans, but for everyone, a global resource. It offers a path to a rich and value-
filled life that, in contrast to many of our home-grown religious traditions, does not set 
itself in opposition to science and rationality, but is wholly compatible with those things. 
Indeed, Thurman said, Tibetan Buddhism could be considered a kind of science in its 
own right; a science of the mind, an inner science, from which we in the West, focused so 
much on the results of our external or outer science, have much to learn.  As Thurman  
put it: “I believe their culture contains an inner science particularly relevant to the 
difficult time in which we live. My desire is to share some of the profound hope for our 
future that they have shared with me" (Thurman, n.d. cited Thurman, 2007)  
What Should We Think? 
  It is that sense of hope in a difficult time that animates much of the current 
interest in Buddhist brains -- that gives the project much of its enchanted quality.  But 
that said, this is a cultural project in re-enchantment that is inherently unstable.  There are 
two reasons for this. The first lies in the fact that there is a basic tension between the 
mainstreaming scientific goals of this enterprise and its larger cultural goals. The 
happiness of enlightened lifestyles is still translated into specific enhanced left prefrontal 
activation; compassionate states of consciousness are still translated into the language of 
gamma waves. In this sense, it is not the logic of the science itself, but more the unique 
cast of characters involved that give this project its sense of being something more than 
business-as-usual. The visuals that accompany the news reports of this enterprise give 
this fact away. Again and again, in this endeavor, visual symbols of opposing values -- 
ancient wisdom and modern science, inner and outer, East and West  -- are juxtaposed to   13 
suggest a union-in-the-making that will be different and finer than the sum of their parts. 
The Dalai Lama in electrodes. The Tibetan monk Matthieu Ricard, wearing his flowing 
monk robes, in a scanning machine.  
  And this point in turn takes me to my next point: where the Dalai Lama really fits 
into this larger project.  In the aesthetic of this enterprise, he is the embodiment of ancient 
Eastern wisdom engaging with modern science, but in fact that role fits him only 
partially. Yes, he is very interested in science, but it is unclear that his goal is to 
“enchant” it. On the contrary, he brings a thoroughly practical and even modernist 
attitude to his interest in science, one that is clearly tempered by his sense that, for 
Tibetan Buddhism to survive in the modern world, both in exile and in Chinese-occupied 
Tibet, it needs to modernize. 
  Earlier in this essay, I mentioned the 2005 meeting of the Society of 
Neuroscience, where the Dalai Lama spoke on the “neuroscience of meditation.”.  In the 
course of his remarks, he suddenly came out with quite a remarkable statement: Having 
affirmed his support for research into the brain bases of meditative practice, he went on to 
say that, in his view,  meditation was nothing more than a technology for rewiring or 
reprogramming the brain in more productive directions. There might well be other 
technologies that could be equally beneficial:  “If it was possible,” he said there, “to 
become free of negative emotions by a riskless implementation of an electrode – without 
impairing intelligence and the critical mind – I would be the first patient.” 
  It was a distinctly modernist, even disenchanting suggestion, and later I asked 
some of my colleagues later what they thought about it. I was struck by their answer: he   14 
hadn’t meant it, they said; it was just a joke. I don’t know if it was or it wasn’t, but this 
reaction seemed significant. .   
  The history here is not over, so a final appraisal of this effort is not yet possible. 
Regardless, though, we should keep an eye on it. We should do so, not only because the 
science is interesting. We should do so because it is in a position to teach us important 
things about the real, complex cultural effects that the brain sciences are having on our 
sense of human values. One important thing they may teach us is this: that, if it is the case 
that we as a society have decided to grant the brain sciences a hugely expanded realm of 
authority to pronounce on our natures, then it should not surprise us if we should also see 
(just as we saw in Weber’s time) are some pre-emptive attempts to ensure that the idiom 
and practices of the brain sciences do not in fact undermine too drastically human values 
that we cherish. It may be okay for us to be brains first and foremost, if we believe that 
being so will still allow room for more of what we care about. 
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